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Social policies that are perceived disproportionately to help African Americans or blacks, in general, and Affirmative Action programs, in particular, have emerged as major political battlegrounds at both federal and state levels. There is a long history of economic discrimination in the United States, and government-supported interventions, such as Affirmative Action programs, have been designed to increase employment opportunities for women and racial minorities in organizational contexts in which they have been historically underrepresented. Although Affirmative Action programs have provided important economic benefits to women, public debate about these programs, and this article, focuses on Affirmative Action framed in terms of race. Affirmative Action has emerged as one of the most controversial racerelated policies in the U.S. and is currently under attack. In response to increasing popular discontent over Affirmative Action policies, federal courts and state legislatures have targeted Affirmative Action programs for severe cutbacks or elimination. In March 1995, the growing contro\.ersy over the perceived effectiveness and fairness of Affirmative Action policies led President Clinton to order a review o f federal Affirmative Action programs. This executive order, along with other highly publicized actions, such as the July 1995 decision of the Board o f Regents of the University of California to eliminate the consideration of race in admissions dczisions, have thru\t Affirmative Action policies into the national spotlight.
Thib article exalnines the determinants of levels of support for social policies that address race-specific incquali~ies. We are interested in the role that traditional and contemporary exprcs~ions of racial prejudice can play in determining levels of support for these policy options. In addition, we are interested in exploring the role that ideological beliefs and attitudes may play in support for race-related policies once the influence of traditional and contcrn1x)rary racial attitudes are controlled. Efforts to reduce the resistance to government programs that attempt to help disadvantaged minority groups and women are dependent on a n enhanced understanding of the dynamics underlying the public's support for such programs. Research that identifies the processes that undergird public opinion on these racial policy questions is a n important step in this direction. Specifically, we seek to understand the relative contribution of racial prejudice, individual and group self-interests, and stratification beliefs in explaining variations in whites' support for government assistance and Affirmative Action for African Americans. A review of the literature suggests that each of these classes of variables may be important in explaining the level of white Americans' opposition to racial-specific policies. Current measures of prejudice, however, obfuscate the understanding of the relative explanatory power of racial and non-racial factors in a political climate where race-related policy issues have achieved new prominence.
Racial Prejudice
The racial prejudice explanation contends that white Americans' opposition to efforts to reduce racial inequality is driven by underlying negative attitudes that they hold towards persons of African descent. This explanation, though, must satisfactorily account for a welldocumented paradox in the literature o n racial attitudes. Over time, there has been a dramatic reduction in levels of racial prejudice expressed by white Americans towards black Americans with n o increase in support for redistributive racial policies (Schuman et al. 1997) . Several researchers suggest that this pattern can be readily explained if w e recognize that there has been a transformation in racial prejudice over time. That is, the old forms of prejudice that gave emphasis to the biological inferiority of blacks have been replaced by new equally powerful forms of prejudice that focus on the pathological culture, maladaptive responses, and deficient attitudinal orientations of blacks. There have been numerous attempts to refine and improve the measurement of racial prejudice so that it would capture the contemporary forms of its expression. This new racial prejudice has been termed cultural racism (Jones 1988) , aversive racism (I<ovel 1970) , symbolic racism (Sears 1988) , laissez-faire racism (Bobo, Icluegel and Smith 1997) , and modern racism (McConohay 1983; Pettigrew 1989) . The various approaches to measuring the new racism all agree that compared to traditional measures of racial prejudice, it is more indirect, subtle. and likely to be expressed in non-racial terms perhaps because of perceived norms of permitted speech or social desirability concerns. Some researchers hold that unobtrusive measures of racial attitudes may hold the key to the identification of contemporary racial prejudice (Crosby, Bromley and Saxe 1980; Fazio, Jackson and Dunton 1995) , while others contend that refined attitudinal measures can capture this for111 of racism (McConohay 1983 : Sears 1988 .
Research on specific policies perceived to be race-related, such as busing or Affirmative Action. has operated on the assumption that racial prejudice might be a central factor underlying ~vhites' opposition to these policies. Studies using new measures of racial prejudice have tollnd that negative attitudes and negative affect toward African Americans play a role in Prejudice and Affirmative Action 505 whites' resistance to policies that promote racial equality (Bobo and I<luegel 1993; Smith 1994: Sears 1988) . For example, Jacobson (1985) found that social distance, stereotypes. and modern racism were strongly and positively related to whites' resistance to Affirmative Action programs at the first order level of analysis. However, modern prejudice was the onl! racial attitude to remain statistically significant after the introduction of other control \~ariables. Robo and Smith (1994) found that racial attitudes were a predictor of opposition to at lcast some race-related policies. Recently, Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) demonstrated that across four countries in Europe, the distinction between blatant (or more traditional) and subtle (more contemporary) prejudice was robust in predicting levels ot support for social policies towards outgroups. In addition, the two types of prejudice related differently to various aspects of social policy.
Several researchers are skeptical about the "new racism" hypothesis. Some have argued that the new racism scales d o not capture underlying racial attitudes of the American public, but instead reflect the ideological biases of liberal social science (Roth 1990; Weissherg 1991) . Roth ( 1 990) argues that there are a number of good reasons for whites to be opposed to racial policies and that social scientists w h o attribute any opposition to racism are "insulated from reality" (35). He views the attitudes of non-supportive whites as reflecting their "well-reasoned attachment to traditional values" (32) and their perception that government support will worsen the social and economic position of blacks. Publicity given to similar expressions by a small number of highly visible blacks lends some credence to these views. Similarly, Weissberg (1991 ) indicates that the new racism scales contain empirically testable positions that researchers have arbitrarily defined as being prejudice or non-prejudice. According to this view, researchers stigmatize as "symbolic racists" or "modern racists" persons who in reality endorse empirically supportable statements that are independent of their personal beliefs about race.
Other problems have been noted with the new racism scales. First, scales such as the modern racism scale appear to confound prejudice with political conservatism (Fazio, Jackson and Dunton 1995; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986) . That is, measures that purport to capture covert and indirect aspects of modern racism measure a conservative political orientation instead. These researchers emphasize that racial prejudice and political conservativism are separable constructs that may have distinctive effects on racial policy positions. Relatedly, some of the items used to-define modern forms of racism reflect underlying circularity in reasoning. For example, Kinder and Sears ( 1981 ) initially used opposition to Affirmative Action as a n indicalor of symbolic racism. Second, some evidence suggests that despite claims to the contrary, the specific items making up scales like the modern racism scale are fairly obvious, direct, and blatant and are subject to social desirability concerns (Fazio, Jackson and Dunton 1995) .
Problems with the conceptualization and measurement of racial prejudice have been highlighted by recent studies that have provided conflicting findings regarding the contribution of prejudice to race-related policy outcomes. Using data from the National Election Study (NES), Gilens ( 1995) assessed the relative contribution of racial attitudes, economic self-interest, individualism, and egalitarianism to white Americans' opposition to welfare. Racial attitudes were measured by eleven questions that captured individual versus structural explanations for racial inequality, belief in the inferiority of blacks, attitudes toward government's responsihilit} for ensuring equal opportunity, and attitudes toward Affirmative Action. This study found that racial attitudes were the most important source of opposition to welfare. Similarly, using data from the General Social Survey (GSS), Kinder and Mendelberg (1995) examined the impact of racial prejudice on racial policy issues dealing with segregation, general government assistance, individualistic remedies, and other public policies that have a n implicit racial component. Racial prejudice was measured by five questions that assessed whites' stereotypes of blacks and two questions that ascertained whites' explanations for racial inequality. This study tound that racial prejudice had a strong consistent impact across all policy domains with its most marked effect on policy issues dealing with the role of government in providing assistance to blacks.
Similarly, Sears et al. (1997) using data from the NES, GSS, and Los Angeles found that measures of symbolic racism (modern racial attitudes that deny racial discrimination, the absence of positive emotions for blacks, and the need for blacks to work harder) were the strongest predictors of lvhites' attitudes toward affirmative action and government assistance for blacks. These measures of contemporary prejudice were stronger predictors of race-related policy items than more traditional measures of racial prejudice and ostensibly non-racial factors such as political party preference and indicators of social, political, moral, and cultural ideo l o~y . Hughes (1997) found a similar pattern of results using data from the NES. Another recent st~ldy used an innovative experimental strategy to measure blatant prejudice in a national sample of whites (ICuklinski et al. 1997) . It found that although levels of blatant prejudice are high, blatant prejudice alone does not account for hostility towards Affirmative Action. However, this study did not measure other forms of prejudice or other non-racial factors.
the same time, other recent studies have concluded that racial prejudice is not an important determinant of opposition to race-related policy issues. Using data from the NES, Sniderman and Carmines (1997) found that a prejudice measure based on racial stereotypes made only a slight contribution to explaining white opposition to Affirmative Action. Similarly, Tuch and Hughes (1996a) , using data from both the NES and the GSS, found that the racial prejudice of whites was unrelated to ten race-related policy issues when group self-interest, egalitarianism, and perceptions of discrimination are considered. In the GSS, prejudice was measured by a scale of racial stereotypes, while in the NES it was assessed by a single measure that combined questions that captured individual versus structural explanations of racial inequality with anti-black affect assessed by a feeling thermometer. The study by Tuch and Hughes has sparked considerable debate (Davis 1996; Jackman 1996; Sears and Jessor 1996; Stoker 1996) . One of the central issues in the critique of this study is the nature and operationalization of prejudice.
The measurement of racial prejudice remains problematic. Although there is no consensus on how best to measure prejudice, most would agree that racial prejudice is a complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon that can be separated into blatant, traditional forms and subtle, indirect forms. Traditional prejudice includes perceived threat and rejection of the outgroup and, if fully developed, includes beliefs in the inherent inferiority of the outgroup (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995). The element of threat is also emphasized by the group position model of prejudice that views prejudice as a sense of group position that is importantly driven ! by perceptions of threat and competition (Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996) . Traditional prejudice also includes the avoidance of intimate social contact. Residential segregation and opposition to intermarriage with the outgroup are among the historic manifestations of this social ostracism (Cell 1982) .
A preoccupation with pathological cultural characteristics is one of the distinguishing features of the new racism (Jones 1988) . Outgroup members are viewed as inferior not because of biology but because they lack the traditional values, motivation, or behavioral strategies that I are necessary for success. Cultural differences between dominant and subordinate groups are exaggerated. and these real or imagined differences are viewed as responsible for any outgroup differences in outcome. A denial of positive emotions for the outgroup, frequently measured by I i anti-black affect on feeling thermometers, is also viewed as a critical, defining feature of modern 1 prejudice (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995) . None of the new racism scales, however, has been , shown to be superior to others, and the optimal indicators of prejudice are yet to be identified. In recent years there has been much interest in identifying non-racial factors that might he predic~ive of racial policy attitudes (Bobo and I<luegel 1993; Bobo and Smith 1994; Crosby 1994) . It has been repeatedly noted that the association between racial attitudes and public policy initiatives is dramatically weakened when the policy is not race-targeted and emphasizes Prejudice and Affirmative Action 507 opportunity enhancement instead of the equalization of outcomes. Moreover, one-fifth to onrthird of African Americans also oppose specific Affirmative Action policies (Kinder and Sanders 1996) . These findings led researchers to seek out non-racialized explanations actively (Bobo 1983; Sears and Funk 1991; Sidanius. Pratto and Bobo 1996) . It was proposed that whites might not support policies that were perceived to be in direct contradiction to their individual and group interests (Bobo 1983 : Jacobson 1985 Sears and Funk 1991) . In addilion, opposition to at least some racial policies may occur because such policies are perceived as violating core American beliefs about the nature of inequality and specifically racial inequality (ICluegel 1985; ICluegel and Smith 1982, 1983; Sears 1988) . It was concluded that variables representing individual and group interests. and stratification beliefs, may be important omitted variables from models that seek to understand attitudes regarding social policies. The inclusion of these variables may facilitate the separation of the racialized from the non-racialized component ot policy non-support.
Self and Group Interests
The concept of self and group interests is driven by an economic zero-sum model and by an early sociological model developed to understand the notion of group position. The self and group interests explanation views whites as rational actors whose individual and group privileges are threatened by redistributive racial policies like Affirmative Action (see Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Citrin and Green 1990; Sears and Funk 1991) . Only recently have researchers distinguished between self and group interests, because self interests have tended to be only moderately related to policy resistance (Bobo 1983; Citrin and Green 1990; Sears and Allen 1984; Sears and Funk 1991 ). Bobo's research (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bobo, ICluegel and Smith 1997) has been especially important in developing the construct of group interests based upon the work of Blumer (1958) . Researchers in this area advocate viewing race relations on the plane of group positioning, and as implicitly contingent upon whites' in-group attachment. These group positions tend to be economic, but can also be cultural or social. They involve maintenance of the status quo and thereby the superior position of whites as a group. The concept of group interests has been operationalized by measures of white in-group solidarity (Dietz-Uhler and Murrell 1993), perceived threat, and African American encroachment (Bobo and Hutchings.1996; Jacobson 1985; Kluegel and Smith 1983) . However, Bobo and Icluegel (1993) also caution that the distinction between individual and group self-interests should not be overdrawn, suggesting that group identities are often related to objective individual characteristics like income, education, and occupation. Jackman (1996) also warns about the difficulties in measuring self-interest. She argues that whites have developed belief systems that allow them to be self-serving without appearing blatantly self-interested.
The empirical evidence to date indicates that both self and group interests play a role in whites' support for racial policy initiatives. Some researchers have found that self-interest measures like subjective social class and income were inversely related to support for Affirmative Action ICluegel 1993: Kluegel and Smith 1983) . I<luegel and Smith (1983) have also noted that group interest measures, such as the perception that one may be "laid off from work because of downsizing" reduced whites' racial policy support. In a recent study of white college students, Kravitz (1995) found that attitudes toward Affirmative Action were more strongly linked to self-interest than to racial prejudice.
Stratification Beliefs
Fiscal conservatism and race-neutral support for only a limited role for government intervention could lead whites to oppose racial policy initiatives while holding positive attitudes toward African Americans (Sniderman and Piazza 1993) . Redistributive racial policies can also be opposed because they are perceived as inconsistent with a range of normative beliefs held hy whites about the nature of opportunity and inequality. Affirmative Action and government intervention to assi3t blacks may be l)erceived as violating cherished American beliefs such as meritocracy and fair play (Crosby 1994; ~<luegel 1985 , 1990 . The market economy of the United S1atc.s i5 viclved by many whites as functioning efficiently to allow those who work hard to \ucceed, of race. Whites may also believe that racial injustice and discrimination are rc.lics of [he past, and that since some inequality is necessary for society to function efficiently, l)olicies promoting racial equality are not only biased but unnecessary (Icluegel 1985: I<l~~c.gel and Smith 1982) . Relatedly, a social dominance orientation, an ideology that legitimatc.s the i~l e~~l i t a b l e distribution of societal rewards, is another type of stratification hc.liel tlrat co~lld lead to opposition to racial policies that assist blacks (Sidanius, Pratto and ~o h o I 996). Some have argued that the paradox of the dramatic decline in traditional, overt i)rc.judice tvithour an increase in policy support can be explained by studying whites' struc~u r a l l>elirts (I<lucgel 1990; Icluegel and Smith 1982, 1983) . That is, whites may have rejected negative ideas about African Americans without endorsing structural explanations to account for conrin~~ing racial disparities in various social indicators.
This article analyzes data from a probability sample from a large metropolitan area to assess the contribution of traditional and contemporary racial prejudice, individual and group self-interests, and stratification beliefs to support for government intervention to help blacks and Affirmative Action. The major advantage of this study is the presence of a broader array ot ideological, racial attitude, values and stratification measures than have been available as a group in prior studies. Prior research has tended to examine these major classes of explanatory factors in isolation or in pairs (see Sears and colleagues [1997] for an exception). We have multiple measures within each class of factors and can examine how each class of factors performs in relation to the others. For example, prior studies have not included measures of both traditional and contemporary forms of prejudice along with other measures of prejudice, for example, lack of emotion for blacks, as well as measures of racial (blacks belong to an inferior race than whites) and non-racial (political and public policy conservatism) ideological positions. In addition, most recent studies have not examined the underlying structure of racial attitudes (Hughes 1997) . Scant attention has been given to the extent to which racial prejudice, presumably non-racial factors, and measures of racial policy are empirically distinct. What is clearly needed at this time is careful examination of how these classes of factors relate to each other and combine to predict whites' support of government initiatives that affect African Americans. Accordingly, we use Confirmatory Factor Analyses to examine the empirical independence of racial prejudice, non-racial factors, and the dependent variables.
The goals of this study are to: (1) develop reliable indicators of the underlying dimensions of racial prejudice and examine the extent to which they are independent from other principled beliefs; ( 2 ) assess the relative contribution of traditional and contemporary prejudice to whites' support for government programs to help blacks in general, and for Affirmative Action in particular; and (3) examine the extent to which the association between racial prejudice and race-related policy outcomes is independent of individual and group self-interests, and stratification beliefs. We hypothesize that contemporary prejudice will be more strongly associated with racial policy attitudes than with traditional prejudice. We also hypothesize that Ollr comprehensive assessment of racial prejudice will be more strongly linked to race-related wcial policies than the non-racial factors.
Methods

Sample
The 1995 Detroit Area Study is a multistage area probability sample representative of the i)oi~lllation eighteen years of age and older, residing in Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb coun-ties in Michigan, including the city of Detroit. The fieldwork was completed between April and October 1995 by University of Michigan graduate students in a research training practicum in survey research and by professional interviewers from the Survey Research Center. Facr-to-tace interviews were completed with 1139 adult respondents, for a response rate of 70 percent. Blacks were oversampled, and the final sample included 520 white and 586 black respondents. The remaining 33 respondents were self-identified Asians, American Indians, and Hispanics. All of the analyses reported in this article use only the white sample. The racial attitudes of whites in the Detroit area have been more carefully studied than in any other U.S. city (Bledsoe et al. 1996) . The racial attitudes of Detroit area whites are generally similar to that of whites in other large cities but due to the extremely high levels of segregation. Detroit area whites sometimes manifest more hostility towards blacks than whites in other large cities (Farley, Rielding and I<rysan 1997; Schuman and Gruenberg 1970) . The white sample obtained in the DAS does not differ from that of the white population in the United States on age or gender, but metropolitan Detroit whites have higher levels of education (32% with a college degree or more versus 25% in the 1995 Current Population Survey [CPS] ) and income (49% with household income of $50,000 or more versus 41 O/O in the CPS) than whites nationally.
Measures
All intervally-scaled attitudinal variables were coded so that a high score reflected a high value of the variable name. In general, this means that high scores reflect dominant values or ideologies and negative views or feelings towards blacks. Two dependent variables that capture support for racial policies were used in our analyses. The Pearson correlation coefficient for these two variables is .43. The first measure is a general one and assessed the extent to which respondents agreed with the statement: "The government should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks living in the United States." The second measure, "I would not mind giving special preferences in hiring and job promotions to blacks," focuses more narrowly on Affirmative Action in employment. Both measures used a four-point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" with a high value signifying a high level of support for racial policies. Prior research indicates that the wording of the question importantly affects the American public's support for racial policies (Bobo and Smith 1994; Schuman 1998; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Steeh and I<rysan 1996) . Questions that focus on an abstract principle garner greater support than those that address a specific policy item (Schuman et al. 1997; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986) . Both of our items deal with the implementation of policy; the first item is general, while the second is one of many specific policy options that could be derived from the first.
Background Factors and Individual and Group Self-Interest
Two demographic variables, age in years, and gender (1 = male, 0 = female) were included as important demographic controls in our analyses. Three indicators of socioeconomic position were used to capture economic self-interest. These are family income in 1994 before taxes, years of formal education, and home ownership ( 1 = owns, 0 = rentslother). Since income is a highly skewed variable, we used its logarithm rather than the actual dollar amount. Income is a widely used and robust indicator of economic self-interest (Gilens 1995), education is related to income and may also be a determinant of the ability to articulate group interests (Jackman and Muha 1984; Schaefer 1996) . and home ownership is an important economic asset. It is one of the most common sources of wealth, and its inclusion is important to characterize fully economic status.
Fraternal deprivation, the perception that one's group is disadvantaged relative to another, has been identified in prior research as a n indicator of group self-interest that is strongly related to race-targeted social policies (Sears and Funk 1991) . Our measure assessed the extent to which respondents felt that over the last five years, whites as a group in the United States had tared better economically compared to blacks. The five-point scale ranged from "much better otf" to "much worse off."
Stratification Beliefs
We ~lsed several indicators of a principled social and political outlook. First, there are two measures ot ideological self-identification as conservative. Respondents rated: (1) their views on social and economic issues, like help for the poor; and (2) their political views on a seven-point 3cale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Political party identification was also used as a n indicator of respondents' views of the appropriate role of government (Davis 1996) . Preliminary analyses revealed that Independents, persons who indicated no party preference, and persons who identified with a party other than the two major ones did not differ from each other on either dependent variable. Accordingly, the party preference measure consisted of three dummy variables: Republicans (the omitted category); Democrats; and a combined residual category (Independent. n o preference, and other party). Social dominance and economic individualism were the two other measures of stratification beliefs. Our social dominance measure used the following three items from the social doniinance scale (Sidanius and Pratto 1993) : "winning is more important than how the game is played;" "we should try to get ahead by any means necessary;" and "sometimes war is necessary to put other nations in their place." Economic individualism was a single-item measure that attempted to capture endorsement of traditional American values of hard work, individualism, and equal opportunity. Respondents used ' a four-point agreeldisagree scale to indicate their endorsement of the statement: "America is a land of opportunity in which you need only to work hard to succeed."
Traditional Prejudice
We used four measures of traditional prejudice. Two items captured perceptions of threat and rejection that are fully developed into a n ideology of inferiority. They measured the extent to which respondents agreed that the following two statements provide the reasons why blacks do not do as well as whites in the United States: "God made the races different as part of a divine plan," and "Whites have more in-born ability than blacks." Both items used a four-point agreeldisagree scale. A single item, n o intimacy, measured opposition to interracial romantic involvement. It assessed the extent to which respondents agreed with the statement, "I would be willing to have romantic relations with a black person." Neighborhood racial preference was the final indicator. It attempted to capture preferences for residential social distance from blacks. Although it has been recently argued that nonracial considerations, such as high rates of crime and welfare dependency and perceptions of poor school quality and inferior municipal services are key determinants of the neighborhood preferences of whites (Harris 1995) . neighborhood preferences nonetheless maintain patterns of racial residential segregation (Clark 1992) . Residential racial segregation remains one of the most pervasive manifestations of racism in society (Massey and Denton 1993) and reflects the purposive implementation of strategies to maintain white supremacy (Cell 1982) . Thus, neighborhood preferences are probably grounded in a very real sense of group position and feelings of threat and direct competition that whites perceive from blacks (cf. Bobo and Hutchings 1996) . Moreover, recent evidence indicates that racial prejudice is a n important component of the residential preferences of whites (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996) . For the neighborhood racial preference measure, respondents were presented with five cards that pictured residential neighborhoods that differed in racial composition and asked to select their most attractive neighborhood. Each neighborhood contained 15 homes. One of the five neighborhoods was all white. and the others contained one, three, five, or eight black households. The measure is based on the respondent's ranking the most attractive residential neighborhood with a value of 1 corresponding to a neighborPrejudice and Affirmative Action 5 1 1
hood that was 53% black and a value of 5 to an all white neighborhood. In our analyses we imputed the mean value on this variable for the respondents (1 5 % ) who refused to make a neighborhood selection. Exploratory analyses revealed that this imputation did not change the association between neighborhood preference and the dependent variables.
Contemporary Prejudice
Eight items assessed contemporary prejudice. Six of them focus on cultural differences and the absence of traditional values, and the final two measured the absence of positive emotions. The first six items all use a four-point agreeidisagree scale. Cultural Ideology measured the extent to which respondents agreed that the reason why blacks do not do as well as whites is because blacks teach their children values and skills that are different from those of whites. For the second measure, respondents indicated the extent to which they believed blacks were lazy by endorsing the statement, "I think that blacks do not work as hard as whites." Third, we used four items from the Modern Racism Scale (McConohay 1983) . These items assessed the extent to which respondents agreed with the following statements: (1) Many other groups have come to the United States and overcome prejudice and worked their way up; blacks should do the same without any special favors; ( 2 ) Discrimination against blacks is n o longer a problem in the United States; ( 3 ) Blacks have a tendency to blame whites too much for problems that are of their own doing; and (4) Over the past few years blacks have gotten more than they deserve. Finally, two questions captured the absence of positive emotion by ascertaining the frequency (on a five-point scale of very often to never) with which whites respond that they have felt ( a ) lack of sympathy and (b) lack of admiration for blacks.
Analysis
The data were weighted for age, gender, and race to take into account differential probabilities of selection and to adjust the demographics of the sample to that of the area from which it was drawn. Initial exploratory factor analysis using maximum likelihood extraction with oblique rotation was used to identify the underlying structure of whites' racial attitudes. Oblique rotation assumes that the factors are correlated and not perfectly measured. The maximum likelihsod method for extracting factors was employed and a minimum eigenvalue of 1 .OO was used to retain a factor. A confirmatory factor analysis was also run. Simple descriptive analyses were used to present .the distribution of responses on the racial policy questions and the prejudice variables. Ordinary least squares regression was used to eslimate the size and statistical significance of the relationships between the independent variables and racial policy questions. The major classes of potential explanatory variables were entered in separate blocks in a set of hierarchical regression models. The first model presents the association between the demographic (age and gender) and the individual and group self-interest variables and the racial policy question. The second model adds the measures of stratification beliefs. The final two models cbnsider the incremental contribution of traditional and contemporary prejudice, respectively. To facilitate an assessment of the relative contribution of the various predictor variables considered in the analysis, both the unstandardized and the standardized regression coefficients are presented for the final model.
Results
The Structure of Racial Prejudice
The first task was to identify the underlying structure of racial prejudice, locating any redundant or overlapping indicators, and empirically demonstrating the extent to which racial prejudice was distinct from stratification beliefs. The twelve racial attitude items and the seven indicators of stratification beliefs were included in initial analyses. Table 1 shows the results of the initial exploratory factor analysis. Six factors emerged. The first factor consisted of only one item, "Discrimination against blacks is n o longer a problem in the United States." The distribution of responses to this item was highly skewed (84% of whites disagreed) and this first tactor caused communality problems. Dropping this item from further analyses improved the fit of the model. Three of the remaining factors reflect clusters of racial attitudes. No emotion consists of the two items capturing the absence of sympathy and admiration for blacks. The traditional prejudice factor consists of the measures of neighborhood preference, romantic relations, and the two items that reflect endorsement of the inherent inferiority of blacks. The modern prejudice factor consists of the two indicators of cultural differences (blacks do not work as hard as whites, and blacks teach their children different values) and the remaining three items from the Modern Racism Scale. Table 1 also shows that our three indicators of conservative political views factor together as d o our three measures of social dominance. Instructively, our indicator of economic individualism did not load with any of the other factors.
We were also interested in the extent to which our dependent variables were distinct from o u r measures of prejudice. In additional exploratory analyses (not shown) we re-ran the factor analysis, dropping the discrimination against blacks item and adding the two dependent variables. The result was a n additional factor o n which the two dependent measures loaded. Importantly, neither of the dependent measures had high factor loadings on any of the prejudice factors. Finally, a confirmatory factor analysis was r u n with all of the independent variables. One of the items capturing the inherent inferiority of blacks (God made the races different) was dropped in order to improve the overall fit of the model (there was high correlated error between this item and 'whites have more inborn ability than blacks'). The best solutioil consisted of six factors: the five factors retained from degrees of freedom, a goodness-of-fit index of .94, a n adjusted goodness-of-fit index of .91, and a root mean square residual of .05. These statistics suggest that the overall fit of the model was within an acceptable range. Based on these results, w e used four indicators of stratification beliefs in the regression models. First, we constructed a scale of the three social dominance items based o n their factor scores (Cronbach's alpha = .56). Second, although the three indicators of conservatism load together as a factor we used them as two variables. Conservatism combined social and economic views with political views, and political party preference was kept as a separate variable so that findings for this variable could be compared with other studies. The three retained variables that capture traditional prejudice (whites more able, romantic intimacy, and neighborhood preference) were entered as separate variables in the regression analyses. There are differences in the scaling of these variables that makes it difficult to combine them into one scale and there is also substantive interest in the potential contribution of these individual variables. The five items loading o n the modern prejudice factor were combined into one scale based on their factor scores (Cronbach's alpha = .73). A scale was also constructed that took the average of the two items that capture n o emotion for blacks. Based on prior theory and research, the modern prejudice scale and the n o emotion scale will be used as indicators of contemporary prejudice (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995) . Table 2 presents the distribution of responses to the social policy questions and the measures of racial prejudice. Levels of whites' support for government intervention and Affirmative Action are relatively high in Detroit. Table 2 indicates that almost half of the sample support government intervention to help blacks (49%) and Affirmative Action programs ( 4 8 % ) . It is likely that levels of support are sensitive t o the particular wording of the question. Nonetheless, Bobo and Smith (1994) show that over 70 percent of respondents in the National Election Study (NES) are opposed to Affirmative Action programs in employment. Moreover, irrespective of how the questions were worded in the NES, over 6 0 percent of whites were strongly opposed to Affirmative Action programs in employment (Kinder and Sanders 1990) . It is not clear why the level of support for Affirmative Action in Metropolitan Detroit is higher than that found in recent national surveys. Prior research indicates that persons in the South and those w h o reside in non-urban areas are less supportive of Affirmative Action programs than urban residents in other regions of the country (Tuch and Hughes 1996a) . The absence in our data of the more rural and racially isolated groups of whites found in national samples may account for this pattern. It is also worth noting, however, that although our Affirmative Action question used the term "preferences" it did not use code words such as "quotas" or "affirmative action" that are known to evoke a negative response (Bobo and Smith 1994; Steeh and I<rysan 1996) .
Support for Racial Policy
Racial Attitudes
Consistent with prior research, most respondents reject the traditional prejudice that our measure of racial ideology captures. Thirteen percent endorse the view that whites have more inborn ability than blacks. At the same time, strong opposition to interracial intimacy persists. Seventy-three percent of our sample indicate that they are personally opposed to romanlic relations with a black person. Preliminary analyses revealed that the relationship between this variable and the two outcome measures was not linear. Thus, Romantic Intimacy consists of three dummy variables: strongly agree, somewhat agree, and disagree (a combined category of disagree somewhat and strongly disagree). Whites also indicated a strong preference for residing in all-white or predominantly white neighborhoods. Fifty-three percent selected the all-white neighborhood as most attractive. Seven percent selected t h e neighborhood that was seven percent black, six percent t h e neighborhood that was 20 percent black, eight percent the neighborhood that was 33 percent black, eleven percent the neighborhood that was 5 3 percent black, and 1 5 percent refused to indicate a neighborhood preference. Thus, two out of three whites preferred a neighborhood that had 20 percent or fewer African Americans. Table 2 also presents the distribution o n the two measures that constitute our indicator of contemporary prejudice. The first measure, n o emotion, consists of two items that capture anti-black affect. A substantial proportion of whites indicate that they d o not often feel positive emotions for blacks. Forty-three percent indicated that they seldom (not too often, hardly ever, never) felt sympathy for blacks, and 48 percent stated that they seldom felt admiration. Our modern prejudice scale consists of five items. The overwhelming majority of whites endorse the first two indicators of modern prejudice. Eighty percent believe that blacks should work their way up like other immigrant groups without any special favors, and 86 percent believe that blacks blame whites too much for problems that are of their own doing. At the same time, most whites indicate .that they recognize that blacks face serious challenges. Sixtyfour percent disagree that blacks have gotten more than they deserve in recent years. How-ever, many whites see blacks as having serious cultural deficits. More than half of the respondents endorse a cultural explanation for outcome differences between blacks and whites. That is, 57 percent agree that blacks are not doing as well as whites because blacks teach their children different values. At the same time, only about one-third (31%) of whites endorse the view that blacks do not work as hard as whites. Table 3 Ilresents the findings for the first policy issue: support for government intervention to help African Americans. The first model shows the associations for the demographic and individual and group self-interest variables. Age tends to be positively related (marginally significant) with the likelihood of endorsing government intervention. Consistent with prior research, women are more likely than men to support federal efforts to assist blacks. Income and education are unrelated to policy support for helping African Americans. Similar findings by Tuch and Hughes (1996a) led those authors to conclude that social class was not an important determinant of whites' racial policy preferences. In contrast, we find that home ownership was inversely related to government help for blacks. Compared to persons who rent, persons who own their homes are more likely to oppose government efforts to assist blacks. Home ownership, a measure of assets, is a better indicator of permanent income or wealth and may be more strongly linked to social class location than is earned household income. Fraternal deprivation, an indicator of group self-interest, was strongly related to the dependent variable. Whites who perceive that over the last five years whites as a group in the United States were worse off than blacks were less inclined to be supportive of government intervention to help African Americans.
Government Intervention to Help Blacks
The second set of variables, stratification beliefs, make an important contribution to understanding variations in the level of support to help blacks. With the exception of social dominance, all of the variables are related to the outcome and together they make an incremental contribution of ten percent to the explained variance. Not surprisingly, we found a strong relationship between conservatism and government assistance for blacks. Persons who scored high on conservatism (conservative o n social and economic, as well as, political issues) were less likely to support government efforts to help blacks than those who indicated that their views were more liberal. Some recent studies have found that political party identification was unrelated to race-targeted social policy (Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Tuch and Hughes 1996b) . In contrast, Table 3 indicates that Democrats were more likely to support government efforts to help blacks than Republicans. Respondents in the Independentslother category do not differ from Republicans.
Social dominance was unrelated to support for helping African Americans while there was a positive association between economic individualism and government support. That is, whites who endorse the universalistic ideology that America is a land of opportunity in which one only needs to work hard to succeed were more likely to support government intervention to help African Americans than those who do not. The addition of stratification beliefs reduces the coefficient for gender by 32 percent and reduces the association between home ownership and government support for blacks by 44 percent.
The third model adds the measures of traditional prejudice. Endorsement of the ideology that whites are more able than blacks is unrelated to government intervention to help blacks, but the other two variables are significant and explain an additional two percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Interestingly, whites who "agree somewhat" that they would have romantic relations with a black person are more opposed to government intervention than those who are opposed to romantic relationships with blacks. At the same time, whites who "strongly agree" with the proposition of having intimate interracial relationships do not differ from those who disagree. In an attempt to understand this somewhat perplexing pattern of findings, we performed additional analyses to identify the characteristics of the individuals in the various categories of response to the romantic intimacy question. Compared to persons who were in the "strongly agree," and the two disagree categories, respondents who indicated that they "agree somewhat" with having romantic relations with blacks, are younger (mean age of 36 years) and have a higher family income (mean of $60,481). Housing preferences are also predictive of support for government intervention. Whites, who indicated that their most attractive neighborhood was one that was all-white or predominantly white, were less likely to support governlnent efforts to help blacks than whites who preferred a more integrated neighborhood.
In general, the addition of the traditional prejudice variables had little effect on most of the variables that were significant in Model 2. There are two exceptions. First, the coefficient for home ownership was reduced slightly but remained significant when adjusted for traditional prejudice. Second, the social dominance variable that was unrelated to the dependent variable in the previous model, now has a marginally significant positive association with support for African Americans. Persons who score high on a social dominance orientation (SDO) tend to be more likely to support federal intervention to help African Americans than those who score low on SDO, once we have taken traditional prejudice into account.
The final model adds the contemporary prejudice items. Both measures were significantly predictive of policy support to help African Americans. Whites who report that they infrequently experience positive emotions for blacks and those who have high scores on the modern racism scale were less likely to support government intervention to help African Americans. Consideration of these variables adds 10 percent to the overall explained variance, bringing the total to 27 percent. The addition of the contemporary prejudice measures changed several of the significant associations observed for some of the other variables. The association of gender with government assistance was reduced to marginal significance while, for the first time, the coefficient for education shows a marginally significant inverse association with government help for blacks. This effect for education provides weak support for the view that higher levels of education are associated with greater ability to develop a n ideology that defends group interests (Jackman and Muha 1984; Schaefer 1996) . The coefficients for fraternal deprivation and conservatism are reduced modestly but remain significant when adjusted for contemporary prejudice. Interestingly, the impact of the other stratification beliefs measures are enhanced in the face of adjustment for contemporary prejudice. The coefficients for both social dominance orientation and economic individualism became substantially larger when adjusted for contemporary prejudice. This suggests that once racial attitudes were accounted for, the endorsement of these ideologies leads to surprisingly higher levels of support for government intervention.
The consideration of contemporary prejudice also affects the association between traditional prejudice and the dependent variable. The neighborhood preference variable is dramatically reduced by 98 percent to non-significance in the fourth model. This clearly suggests that the driving force behind preferences for living in an all-white neighborhood is not traditional prejudice, but the contemporary, subtle kind. It could be that those who prefer predominan~ly white neighborhoods live in them and have no context that might lead to sympathy for blacks. Overall, Table 3 indicates that contemporary racial attitudes play the most important role in determining levels of support for government intervention to help African Americans, but variables that capture socioeconomic posilion and group self-interests, stratification beliefs, and traditional prejudice are also important. Inspection of the standardized regression coefficients support this conclusion. The largest betas are evident for contemporary prejudice ( -.29 for modern prejudice and -. 18 for no emotion) and stratification beliefs ( -. 19 for conservatism, .I2 for soc~al dominance and .12 for economic individualism). Table 4 presents the findings for Affirmative Action. The first model considers the impact of the demographic variables and the indicators of individual and group self-interest. Women are more likely to support Affirmative Action than men. Similar to the pattern in able 3, household income and years of formal education are unrelated to support for Affirmative Action, but home owners are less likely than renters to support Affirmative Action. As noted earlier, the inclusion of a measure of wealth (home ownership) may mask the consistent finding in prior research that education is positively related to opposition of Affirmative Action (Hughes 1997; Schuman et al. 1997) . Those with greater economic assets are more inclined to endorse a n ideology that protects the status q u o (Jackman and Muha 1984; Schaefer 1996) . The indicator of group self-interest, fraternal deprivation, is unrelated to Affirmative Action. This set of variables contributes only four percent to the explained variance.
Affirmative Action
The addition of the stratification beliefs variables in Model 2 makes a modest contribution to explained variance ( 5 % ) . Conservatism is inversely related to Affirmative Action. Whites who self-identify as conservative on social, economic, and political issues are more likely to oppose Affirmative Action than those who categorize themselves as liberal. Self-identified Democrats were also more likely to be supportive of Affirmative Action than Republicans. Social dominance orientation was unrelated to Affirmative Action, but similar to the findings in Table 3 , we find a strong positive relationship between economic individualism and support for Affirmative Action. Whites w h o believe that American society provides equality of opportunity are more likely than those w h o do not to support Affirmative Action. Adjustment for stratification beliefs reduces the coefficient for gender by 30 percent and the association between home ownership and support for Affirmative Action by one-half to nonsignificance. Thus, location in social structure appears to affect beliefs about Affirmative Action, at least in part, through its effects o n the rationalization for social position (stratification beliefs).
Model 3 shows the contribution of the traditional prejudice variables. Two of the three variables are significant and together they explain a n additional two percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Similar to the pattern observed for Table 3 , agreement with the ideology that whites are more able than blacks was unrelated to support for Affirmative Action in this model. Compared to whites w h o are opposed to intimate interracial relations, whites who strongly endorse such interracial contact are more likely (marginally significant) to support Affirmative Action while those w h o weakly support intimate relations d o not differ. There is also a strong inverse relationship between preference for racially segregated residential areas and support for Affirmative Action. Whites who rate all-white neighborhoods as most attractive were more likely to oppose Affirmative Action than those w h o prefer racially integrated neighborhoods. This association exists despite controls for stratification beliefs and variables that capture economic self-interest such as income, education, and home ownership.
The fourth column presents our findings for contemporary prejudice. Both indicators are related to support for Affirmative Action and they make a substantial 10 percent contribution to the explained variance. That is, these two measures account for virtually half of all the variation explained in whites' support of Affirmative Action. Whites who seldom experience positive emotions for blacks are less likely to support Affirmative Action and modern prejudice is inversely related to Affirmative Action. The pattern of findings in Table 4 clearly suggests that racial attitudes, especially contemporary prejudice, play a dominant role in accounting for variations in support for Affirmative Action.' The beta coefficients for the contemporary prejudice indicators are considerably larger than those of the other variables in the model with the 1 . As noted earlier, the initial lactor analysis indicated that the independent variable\ loaded on different factors than the dependent variables. We were nonetheless concerned about the potential conceptual overlap hc~rveen our measure of Affirmative Action and the ,blacks should work their way up' item o n the modern p r e i~~d i c e 5caIe ("Manv gnlups have come to the United State, and overcome prejudice and worked their way up: black5 \hould do the same without any \pecial favors"). Examination of the Pearson correlations revealed that all I I~ the modern p r e i~~d~c tItems correlated .18 or less with Alfirmative Action, wlth the smallest correlation ( . l o ) being tor the 'blachs should work their way up' ilem. In addit~on. we re-ran the final model with this item removed from the modern prel~~dice \calr and the \ubstan~ive findings were unchanged. coefficient for no affect (-.29) being almost twice as large as that for modern prejudice (-.16). Similar to the pattern observed in Table 3 the coefficients for both economic individualisni and social doniinance became larger and more significant when adjusted for racial prejudice. Contemporary prejudice also importantly affects some of the significant associalions observed in Model 3 for the traditional prejudice items. The belief that whites have more inborn abilit!. than blacks, which was unrelated to the dependent variable in the third model is now positively related to support for Affirmative Action. Whites who attribute poorer outcomes for blacks to innate differences are more supportive of Affirmative Action. It is probably ideologically consis~ent that beliefs about the inherent inferiority of blacks, stripped of other racial conipoIients, can lead to a sympathetic response towards assisting blacks. That is, if blacks are biologically inferior, they are incapable of helping themselves and thus deserving of charitable assistance. Similar to the pattern in Table 3 , the neighborhood preference variable is reduced t o non-significance when adjusted for contemporary prejudice. Apparently, these are overlapping sources of variation with both measures assessing indirect, subtle forms of prejudice.
When adjusted for contemporary prejudice, an intriguing pattern is observed for romantic intimac),. The dummy variable for "strongly agree" in Model 3 is reduced by half to nonsignificance in Model 4, indicating that persons who strongly favor interracial intimacy do not differ in le~zels of support for Affirmative Action from those who are opposed. At the same time, the dummy variable for "somewhat agree" increases by a third and is now inversely related to the dependent variable (similar to the pattern in Table 3 ). Compared to those who are opposed to black-white romantic relationships, whites who express weak approval are less likely to support Affirmative Action. This suggests that a weak or superficial commitment to equality in social interaction can lead one to reject notions of special assistance. It may be that responses to the two "agree" options to the romantic intimacy question capture qualitatively different visions of interracial romantic liaisons. Our question did not ask about interracial marriage. While whites who "strongly agree" may support interracial relationships that could lead to marriage, those who "somewhat agree" may be supportive only of the type of transient, exploitative sexual contact that has historically been a part of interracial relations in the U.S. There is no reason to believe that those who support the latter type of intimacy would demonstrate commitment to racial policy items.
In sum, we found that the overall level of support was similar for both of the social policy variables considered. However, the predictors that we examined played a somewhat larger role in accounting for the variation in government help to support blacks compared to support for Affirmative Action (R2 of 27% compared to an R2 of 21 %, respectively). At the same time, racial prejudice explains almost half of the variance in government support for blacks and more than half of the total variance explained in support for Affirmative Action. Importantly, the contribution of contemporary prejudice was five times greater in explaining variance on these racial policy queslions than the contribution of our indicators of traditional prejudice.
Discussion
In contrast to the view that whites' racial attitudes are not importantly related to their racial policy positions (Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Tuch and Hughes 1996a) , our results indicate that racial prejudice is alive and well and strongly associated with whites' support of societal policies to assist African Americans. We used multiple indicators of racial attitudes that capture different aspects of prejudice. Although some of the effects are specific to the particular measure employed and the particular outcome under consideration, we found racial prejudice, especially in its modern forms, to be the strongest predictor of variations in support for government programs to assist blacks, in general, and Affirmative Action in employment, in particular. Traditional prejudice indicators made only a modest contribution. Although Icinder (1986) indicates that his initial claims of the death of traditional racism were overstated (ICinder and Sears 198 1 ), many observers adhere to the view that traditional measures of prejudice are no longer important determinants of contemporary race-related policy issues. In contrast, our analyses revealed that although the net contribution of the traditional measures of racial attitudes is relatively small, the associations of these measures to racial policy views are neither simple nor straightforward and their inclusion captures some of the complexities in the comprehensive measurement of racial attitudes.
Thus, our findings raise important questions about the appropriate conceptualization and measurement of racial prejudice. We used a conceptualization of prejudice that, broadly conceived, corresponds with the literature's larger distinction between traditional forms of prejudice and subtle, indirect modern forms of prejudice. Some have suggested that since the two forms of prejudice are strongly correlated and tend to have identical causes and consequences. thev may not be two different kinds but may exist on a continuum of prejudice and only differ in terms of degree (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986) . In contrast, consistent with some other recent studies (Hughes 1997 : Sears et al. 1997 we found that the distinction between the different types of prejudice was useful in predicting the different types of racial policy issues considered.
Moreover, the traditional-contemporary distinction plays an important role in enhancing our understanding of the relationship of other variables to race-related policy options. This is readily evident for the relationship of conservativism to racial policy issues. There has been some debate about the extent to which political conservatism is independent of racism (Piazza, Tetlock and Sniderman 1991; Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996) . Instructively, our findings indicate that the strong relationship between conservatism and government support to help African Americans was unaffected when adjusted for traditional prejudice and reduced modestly when controlled for contemporary prejudice. In contrast, controlling for contemporary prejudice reduces the relationship between conservatism and Affirmative Action to marginal significance. Thus our findings suggest that racial prejudice and not conservatism is the major important factor underlying whites' attitudes towards Affirmative Action. At the same time, conservatism is a n important factor, independent of traditional and contemporary prejudice in the generic opposition to an active role for the government in reducing racial inequalities.
Racial prejudice, individual and group self-interest, and stratification beliefs are classes of factors that we found to be related to resistance to Affirmative Action policies. Each of these classes represents schools of thought that present plausible explanations about why whites may be reluctant to support racial policies like Affirmative Action. We explored a particular framing of Affirmative Action policy which was race-targeted and proposed to equalize outcomes. In the multivariate models, measures of traditional and contemporary prejudice combined explained more variance on both of our dependent variables than any of the other classes of variables assessed. Thus, we find that racial prejudice is the most important determinant of levels of support for the two race-related policy issues considered. These findings suggest that as long as Affirmative Action is packaged and framed as a race-targeted, outcomesequalizing program, racial attitudes will continue to exert an influence on whites' positions.
Some of the more intriguing findings in this paper were for our indicators of ideological beliefs. Once we statistically controlled for all of our measures of racial prejudice, we found that whites who adhere to basic American values of equal opportunity and hold beliefs that some groups are dominant over others were supportive of government help for blacks and favor Affirmative Action. Whites who believe in the inherent superiority of their own race were also supportive of Affirmative Action. Hughes (1997) also found, using national data, that traditional prejudice was positively related to support for Affirmative Action when controlled for contemporary forms of prejudice. These findings initially appear to be counter-iniuitive and are definitely inconsistent with the view that it is the commitment to core American values of individualism that underlies whites' opposition to attempts to improve the status of blacks (Lipset 1996; Lipset and Schneider 1978; cf. Kinder and Sanders 1996) . We believe that these results may need to be the focus of an additional study.
Overall, our analyses indicate that race-related beliefs have much to do with negative positions on race-related policy positions. We have argued that these negative positions have much to do with racial prejudice. On the other hand, those possessing superior group dominant ideological positions (social dominance orientation and beliefs in the inherent inferiority of blacks) may feel that government help is necessary in order to be consistent with larger American values. That is, if we remove that part of the variation in policy positions due to racial prejudice, traditional American values of hard work, individualism and equal opportunity may lead to the view that blacks are deserving of assistance (given their constitutional deficiencies). Particularly noteworthy is the fact that both the endorsement of social dominance and racial inferiority (positive direction but not statistically significant in the government help models) were only significant when the contemporary prejudice items were added to the models. Similarly, the coefficient for economic individualism (the value of equal opportunity) was positively related to support of both Affirmative Action and government help but became larger when the contemporary prejudice items were added to the final model. These findings indicate that when racial prejudice is reduced (at least statistically) then basic American values of equal opportunity may lead whites who also believe in the inherent inferiority of blacks and their subordinate position (social dominance) to actually support efforts by government to aid blacks. These results are consistent with Jackman's (1994) view that the paternalism of dominant groups often includes affection and sympathy for those being exploited.
Future research is needed that would provide a clearer sense of temporal ordering of the associations between prejudice and public policy. Cross-sectional analyses, including those reported here, allow for the possibility that Affirmative Action and other government efforts to assist blacks may be the cause of contemporary prejudice. Qualitative data collection that allows whites to engage in open-ended discourse on these issues could provide some clues as to the likely causal dynamics (Blauner 1989; Gans 1962:415-416; Wellman 1993) . Recently, Bonilla-Silva and Forman (forthcoming) highlighted the usefulness of combining quantitative and qualitative approaches. They completed in-depth reinterviews with a subsample of white college students who had earlier completed a structured survey. They found that students were less supportive of Affirmative Action in the in-depth interviews than in the survey. Open-ended discourse allowed these students, w h o were very sensitive to not appearing 'racist,' the opportunity to qualify their racial views and to express their opposition to Affirmative Action indirectly. Clearly, there is a need for qualitative and quantitative data that would enhance our understanding of the dynamic nature of racial attitudes and identify the individual and social factors that predict changes in them over time.
It is possible that the findings reported in this paper would be different if we had examined a wider range of outcomes. Affirmative Action is a complex phenomenon and the term covers a broad range of different programs. These include programs that seek to eliminate discrimination, emphasize recruitment and training, hire particular proportions or quotas from a pool of qualified applicants, and provide preferential treatment in selection decisions (IZravitz 1995) . Levels of support for particular types of programs may differ, depending on whether they emphasize compensatory policies or preferential treatment (Steeh and Icrysan 1996) . Our measure of Affirmative Action and government support focused on a more global assessment and did not capture these subtleties. In addition, our Affirmative Action measure was limited to Affirmative Action in the area of employment. Some evidence suggests that policies dealing in the area of education receive higher levels of support than those addressing employment issues (Bobo and Smith 1994) . It has also been noted that attitudes towards Affirmative Action programs are importantly related to the perceived fairness of the programs. Our analyses provided no information on the specific characteristics of the program. Future research that considers a broader range of programs and also attends to the characteristics of specific programs might e n h a n c e o u r understanding of s o m e of t h e specific characteristics that m a y b e determinants ot varying levels of support.
O u r results suggest that racial prejudice matters a lot a m o n g whites, but that t h e r e is also r o o m for principled support, a n d opposition, t o race relevant public policies. S o m e seemingly principled opposition is symbolic a n d is subtly a b o u t race, a n d s o m e seems t o b e principled both of a politically conservative a n d liberal variety. O u r challenge i n future analyses a n d studies is to understand h o w political, social, a n d economic positions, ideological beliefs, self a n d group interests, a n d traditional a n d contemporary racial prejudice influence b o t h principled, a n d perhaps not s o principled, opposition, a n d support for public policies related t o t h e color line in t h e United States.
